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Getting Our Stories Straight: Narrative
Autonomy and Feminist Commitments
MILTON C. REGAN, JR.*
In an original and stimulating paper, Susan Williams has suggested that
feminists can find value in civil society to the extent that it features communities
that nurture their members' capacity for autonomy. Her argument flows from
recognition of the importance of social relationships in fostering individual self-
governance. Such relationships enable an individual to act autonomously when
they encourage her to ask whether her commitments are consistent with a sense
of her life as an integrated narrative.
Professor Williams's account of autonomy has a richness and subtlety that
present a sharp contrast to the model conventionally attributed to liberal
individualism. Her model rejects the vision of the autonomous individual as
"securely isolated from his threatening fellows."' It offers instead a socially
embedded self capable of reflecting on which attachments are most consistent
with her sense of identity. At the same time, I want to suggest that we can see
Williams's paper as a contribution to the liberal project. She accepts its
normative commitment to autonomy, but offers a better description ofjust how
the process of self-determination unfolds.
Seeing the paper in this light reveals certain tensions in her model, tensions
that characterize feminism more generally. The liberal project has emphasized
the abstract individual who is due respect because of her capacity for autonomy,
regardless of her particular individual characteristics. Liberalism has argued that
we must look beyond ostensibly superficial differences to find the common
features that unite human beings as such. Much of recent feminism, however, has
expressed suspicion of the liberal emphasis on universality. It has directed
attention to the ineradicability of difference and the importance of respecting the
particularity of individuals.
Can feminism honor its commitment to the universal ideal of autonomy and
still maintain its appreciation for difference? Will insistence on communities that
foster autonomy enlist feminism in the homogenization of civil society? Or will
solicitude for a diversity of social forms undercut the critical force of feminism?
One of the attractions of Professor Williams's model is that it has the potential
to mediate between feminist commitments to universality and difference. My
comments are intended to suggest just how this might be so.
Let me begin with liberal theory. Over the past fifteen years or so,
communitarian and feminist thinkers have vigorously criticized that theory for
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, I
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989). We must be careful not to attribute this vision to all liberal
theories of autonomy. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE,
AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 220 (1990) (discussing "situated
autonomy," which involves "critical reflection on inherited values, personal commitments, and
basic goods, not a flight from and abandonment of them").
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its unrealistic depiction of individuals as atomized and asocial.2 These critics
have argued that liberal theory is incoherent in conceptualizing individuals as
distinct from their ends and purposes. They maintain that liberalism fails to
capture important aspects of social experience by characterizing all relationships
as voluntarily established. Finally, critics assert that liberals neglect the fact that
the very sense of one's self as a distinct individual depends on involvement in
social relationships.
These criticisms reveal serious inadequacies in liberalism understood as a
descriptive theory of human experience. In recent years, however, several
thinkers have emphasized that the individualism that characterizes liberal theory
is meant not as a description of social life, but as a way of emphasizing the
normative importance of individual self-determination and critical reflection-in
short, of autonomy. That is, liberal individualism is meant to drive home the
point that, regardless of her inevitable location in a history shared with others,
an individual can "reflect upon his or her history and, as a result of that
reflection, come to alter one's aims and attachments."3 Put differently, liberal
individualism expresses the view that "all moral obligations and social
arrangements stand in need of justification to... the individual normatively
characterized." 4 Liberalism's normative commitment to autonomy therefore need
not be disturbed by arguments that individuals as a factual matter are primarily,
or even exclusively, socially constituted. Even if that is so, this does not mean
that the influences that shape the individual should automatically have any moral
claims on her.
As a result, it becomes clear that the portrait of the abstract individual in
liberal theory is meant to emphasize that all individuals, regardless of particular
attributes, personal history, or station in life are entitled to self-determination.
Liberalism asserts that what is of moral significance about individuals is defined
apart from our particularity: it is our capacity to distance ourselves from any
commitment or attachment and ask whether it is consistent with the life we want
to lead.
When we make normative claims about human beings, however, it is natural
that we also draw mental pictures about the lives of the flesh-and-blood
individuals who are the subjects of those claims. Thus, despite liberals' emphasis
on their theory as normative in nature, many observers have inferred certain
descriptive assumptions that seem implicit in that theory. The emphasis on
abstract individuals with no constitutive ties has tended to promote a description
of the experience of autonomy as freedom unfettered by involvement with others.
2. See, e.g., VIRGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY (1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in
FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 279 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990); CHARLES TAYLOR,
Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187-210 (1985).
3. J. DONALD MOON, CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY: MORAL PLURALISM AND TRAGIC
CONFLICTS 50 (1993); see also DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 349 (1986); WILL
KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 50-52 (1989).
4. Alisa L. Carse, The Liberal Individual: A Metaphysical or Moral Embarrassment?, 28
Nofs 184, 185 (1994); see also Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian
Debate, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 159 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
[Vol. 72:449
GETTING OUR STORIES STRAIGHT
The implication is that human agency is threatened by social relationships. On
this view, achieving autonomy requires constant vigilance lest the claims or
needs of others intrude on individual sovereignty. As Jennifer Nedelsky has
observed, the emphasis has been on the preservation of boundaries among
individuals.' One consequence is the idea that preserving autonomy in the midst
of social relations requires as a psychological matter that we regard all
attachments in civil society as voluntary associations. As such, they are both
freely chosen and freely terminated without any effect on the independent self
who makes such decisions.6
Where does feminism fit into this? On the one hand, the ideal of autonomy
promoted by the normative project of liberalism is an important commitment of
feminism. As Deborah Rhode observes, "[s]ome concept of autonomy has been
central to the American women's movement since its inception, autonomy from
the constraints of male authority and traditional roles."7
On the other hand, many women do not recognize themselves in the implicit
psychology that has been associated with the liberal ideal of autonomy. That
psychology has seemed inattentive to the ways in which concrete individuals
actually experience their relations with others in the course of seeking to live
autonomously. Many feminists therefore have sought a richer descriptive account
of autonomy that does justice to its experiential complexity. In particular, they
have pressed for a model whose protagonist is the situated, rather than isolated,
individual.' For such an individual, social relationships do not simply constrain
autonomy, but enable it as well. Such relationships can be constitutive of
individual identity, entering into one's sense of self. Furthermore, the situated
individual uses not only reason, but also emotion, in developing and expressing
her autonomy. This account of the autonomous individual as grounded in the
social and natural world is consistent with feminism's tendency to insist on
attention to the particularities of concrete experience, rather than idealized
models of human life. 9
We might say, then, that Williams's paper is a sterling example of the way in
which feminism seeks a more adequate description of the autonomous individual
who occupies center stage in normative liberal theory. While committed to the
liberal project, she offers the outlines of a moral psychology more plausible than
the one attributed to the abstract subject of that theory.
5. See Nedelsky, supra note 1; Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded
Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 162 (Robert Post ed., 1991).
6. DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 44-45 (1989).
7. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 628 (1990); see
also Nedelsky, supra note 1, at 8-9; Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102
YALE L.J. 1265, 1280 (1991) (book review). This reflects but one sense in which feminism
draws inspiration from many of the tenets of liberalism, which challenge social hierarchy in the
name of the individual. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 61
(1989); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN 118 (1989); Rhode, supra, at 1279.
8. See, e.g., MEYERS, supra note 6, at 42-58; Nedelsky, supra note 1.
9. "[F]eminist theory strives to remain anchored in the lived experience of women."
Dailey, supra note 7, at 1274; see also Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1707 (1990).
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It's important to emphasize that, just as we can infer certain descriptive
assumptions from liberalism's normative vision, certain normative implications
flow from feminism's descriptive model of autonomy.
In particular, if autonomy is a capacity that must be developed in connection
with others, then we may have certain obligations to ensure that conditions exist
that serve to nurture it. Put differently, autonomy is a positive liberty that may
create affirmative duties, not simply a negative liberty that enjoins us from
interfering with others.'0 In this way, commitment to the moral priority of
individual self-determination requires attention to the shape of the larger
community and society."
In its commitment to the fundamental importance of autonomy, feminism can
be seen as subscribing to what John Rawls might call "comprehensive
liberalism."' 2 That is, feminism regards autonomy as a basic feature of the good
life for individuals in all dimensions of experience. It is this commitment to
autonomy that leads Williams to maintain that feminists should support only
those communities in civil society that encourage their members' exercise of
narrative autonomy. This assertion can be seen as an articulation of the universal
imperative of the liberal project. All persons, regardless of particular attributes
or commitments, are entitled to develop and exercise their capacity for autonomy.
It follows that all communities, regardless of particular features or traditions,
should promote this practice in their members.
Thus, abstracting from differences among communities, only those that satisfy
this universal standard are worthy of support and preservation. In this sense,
feminist commitment to autonomy is a commitment to universality. 3
On the other hand, contemporary feminism has proclaimed the importance of
attention to particularity and difference. 4 Insistence on the ineradicability of
difference has been prompted in part by suspicion of the liberal narrative and its
10. This distinction is drawn from ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1970).
11. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 425 (1986).
12. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 78 (1993).
13. At a minimum, the commitment is universal in the sense that it is applicable to members
of modem liberal democracies that place importance on autonomy. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note
11, at 390-95. As such, it is an example of an approach to political theory that seeks more
generally to articulate implicit normative commitments of liberal society. See RAWLS, supra
note 12, at 8. Those who engage in this project, however, often tend to find it difficult to avoid
assuming the universal validity of certain minimum values. See, e.g., STEPHEN MULHALL &
ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 286 (1992).
In any event, as the remainder of my essay suggests, the attention to context demanded by
Professor Williams's model should prompt appreciation of the need for empathetic assessment
of women's complex experience in different cultures even if we regard feminism as committed
to the trans-cultural value of autonomy. For one effort to engage in such assessment, see Claire
Robertson, Grassroots in Kenya: Women, Genital Mutilation, and Collective Action, 1920-
1990, 21 SIGNS 615 (1996).
14. See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-
Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 154 (Eva F. Kittay
& Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987); Iris M. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the
Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250 (1989).
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use of a protagonist depicted in abstract terms. Feminists have argued that the
identification of ostensibly universal features of human beings is a political
process that inevitably reflects the perspective of those with power. The result
is that those who do not conform to these criteria are stigmatized as "different"
and are marginalized within society. In particular, women have suffered from
being judged according to ostensibly universal standards that are rooted in male
experience. 5 Feminists have criticized communitarians on similar grounds,
arguing that their assumptions of a unitary conception of the good life ignore
important differences of perspective and values within society. 6 Finally,
feminists have become more sensitive to the danger that positing a universal
women's experience ignores the diversity of experience among women correlated
with phenomena such as class, race, sexual orientation, and other
characteristics. 7 Such attention to particularity and difference flows naturally
from feminism's focus on concrete experience. It has led to the argument that
respect for individuals requires attention to their othemess-to the ways in which
they are irreducibly distinctive. 8
Feminism's commitments to both universality and difference create tensions
in a feminist assessment of the social forms that make up civil society. On the
one hand, feminist enlistment in comprehensive liberalism suggests that all social
forms should be "modernized" in accordance with the liberal vision. Only this
will ensure autonomy for all individuals, regardless of their particular
affiliations. In particular, feminism insists as a core commitment that
subordination of women must be ended in all social forms.' 9 Regardless of the
differences among those forms, none warrant respect unless they meet this
minimum universal principle.
On the other hand, respect for difference might prompt acceptance of social
forms that don't regard the cultivation of members' autonomy as an important
value. This would seem to lead to support for social forms that constitute
themselves in direct opposition to modern liberal values. One might argue, for
instance, that attention to the diverse perspectives of women arguably requires
respect for the claims of Amish or fundamentalist Christian women that their
communities enable them to live meaningful and satisfying lives, even though
others may regard them as within the grip of social forms with oppressive gender
roles.
15. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 357, 357-58 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991).
16. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1721
(1988).
17. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988).
18. The concept of positionality, for instance, emphasizes that a person's knowledge of the
world is influenced by her particular position within it. Any perspective therefore will
inevitably be a partial one, whose adequacy can be improved only by supplementing it with
other perspectives. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
880-87 (1990).
19. See Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63,
87-88 (1993).
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At first blush, feminism might seem faced with the choice between working
toward remaking civil society according to the liberal blueprint or valorizing
virtually all social forms within it. The narrative account of autonomy that
Professor Williams offers, however, can serve to mediate between these two
poles. It presents a universal normative ideal that nonetheless can be realized in
a variety of particular ways. Attention to the complex ways in which socially
embedded selves seek self-governance makes clear that we cannot fulfill our
commitment to autonomy by imposing on all of civil society the liberal model of
the voluntary association. Rather, we must attend to the diverse settings in which
individuals are able to construct and reconstruct narratives in which they take
responsibility for the course of their lives.
Just how the narrative model of autonomy is elaborated therefore will help
shape how feminism reconciles its commitments to universality and particularity
when it engages in an assessment of civil society.
Let me offer just one example of how complex that process might be. Consider
women who accept traditional gender roles because of their understanding of the
demands of biology or religion. Are these women acting autonomously? What
position should feminists take toward social forms that encourage and reinforce
such choices?
We have a sense of the texture of some of these women's lives from studies of
women who are active in what is called the pro-life movement?' Research
indicates that many such women believe that biology represents "a natural order
that should really be allowed to prevail."'" This means at least two things to
them. First, men and women are "intrinsically different," which dictates that each
sex has specific roles to play in life.22 Second, reproduction is a natural process
that individuals should not attempt to render completely subject to human
control.23 For these reasons, motherhood is both a primary and inevitable role for
women, which they should not seek to evade.24
For many who characterize themselves as pro-life activists, relhctance to
tamper with apparent biological imperatives is reinforced by religious belief.
Such women are "skeptical about the ability of individual humans to understand,
much less control, events that unfold according to a divine, rather than human,
blueprint."2 Events such as an unplanned pregnancy that seem problematic on
the surface may ultimately be sources of great joy because of a larger plan. For
this reason, pro-life women regard it as arrogant for individuals to disrupt
pregnancy simply because it occurs at a time that does not conform to human
convenience.
20. See FAYE D. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIvEs: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (1989); KRIsTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
21. LUKER, supra note 20, at 159.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 169-70; see also GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 215 (discussing pro-life activists
concerned that easy access to abortion undermines "the imperative of motherhood as a
condition beyond human control").
24. LUKER, supra note 20, at 202.
25. Id. at 186.
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For the women I have described, a good life therefore is one lived in
conformity with the dictates of biology and/or religion-not one devoted to
human mastery and control. Are these women leading autonomous lives? Or are
they oppressed, having simply internalized rationalizations that justify their
subordination?
On the one hand, it is not hard to make a case that they are not genuinely
autonomous as that term is conventionally understood. These women seem
willing to accept the constraints of ascribed roles, rather than to rely on their own
initiative to fashion lives that express their unique individuality. By tying
themselves so closely to the domestic sphere, they reinforce a state of affairs in
which women are largely dependent upon men for their material welfare. A
comprehensive liberal therefore could easily argue that the restricted
opportunities and apparent fatalism of these women are inconsistent with the
conditions of true autonomy.
If we listen more closely to these women's narratives, however, we can discern
more complexity. Faye Ginsburg has suggested that pro-life women do not regard
acceptance of their ostensibly natural role as passive acquiescence to biological
difference. Rather, acceptance of that role involves an active affirmation of the
biological features that are regarded as the basis for female identity.26 Ginsburg
describes the crucial role of narrative in this process. Pro-life women often
describe the trajectory of their lives as a process of overcoming initial
ambivalence about or even resistance to pregnancy, which culminates in the
willing embrace of one's female nature.27 For some women, early identification
with liberal feminism contributed to reluctance to accept their role. Coming to
accept that role thus required them to take a critical perspective toward an initial
commitment' In short, the pro-life women Ginsburg describes regard a female
identity as something to be gained through effort, "rather than a biologically
based ascription. 29
These women do not see themselves as working to reinforce a system of male
privilege. From their perspective, they are seeking to preserve an intricate set of
social relationships that valorize women by promoting feminine values of nurture
and responsibility." Crucial to this matrix is the way in which the possibility of
pregnancy serves to constrain male sexual activity. For these women, linking sex
to pregnancy and marriage limits the tendency to regard women as sex objects
and, serves as "the linchpin for the material security of women with
dependents."'"
Easy access to abortion is seen as threatening these social arrangements.
Giving women the option of abortion weakens social pressure on men to take
emotional and financial responsibility for the reproductive consequences of sex. 2
A system of complementarity between men and women is undermined by a rival
26. GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 127.
27. Id. at 217-18.
28. Id. at 194.
29. Id. at 218.
30. LUKER, supra note 20, at 162.
31. GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 214.
32. Id. at 214.
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vision of individualism, in which men and women are free to act as unfettered
self-interested actors. According to pro-life women, such atomistic equality is
rendered plausible only by positing that women as well as men separate sexual
pleasure and individual ambition from procreation and caregiving. 3 This
depiction of women's sexuality represents "an active denial by women of two
essential conditions of female gender identity: pregnancy and the obligations of
nurturance that should follow."34 The availability of abortion thus makes it easier
for men to exploit women,35 as a sense of collective responsibility for those who
are pregnant gives way to "'heartless individualism."'36
For pro-life activists, this transformation reflects the broader disturbing trend
to valorize the values of the market over the norms of the family. Abortion makes
a fetus's life depend on another person's assessment of the costs and benefits
that it will produce.37 It devalues motherhood and nurturance by authorizing a
woman to end that life if it would interfere with her professional or financial
ambitions. From this perspective, abortion is part of several developments in
modem society that threaten respect for the basic dignity of each individual, no
matter how powerless.
Not only do pro-life women see these changes as jeopardizing women by
promoting an ethic of individualism. They also see them as reducing women's
autonomy by making it more difficult to lead a traditionally feminine way of life.
As Kristen Luker observes, "a social ethic that promotes more freely available
sex undercuts pro-life women [in] two ways: it limits their abilities to get into a
marriage in the first place, and it undermines the social value placed on their
presence once within a marriage."38 A homemaking career also is undermined by
the increasing availability of other domestic services from sources outside the
household,39 and by the diminishing number of stay-at-home women who might
provide a support network for women choosing a traditional role.4"
From the perspective of these women, feminist support for liberal reforms
contributes to the oppression of traditional women and diminishes their
autonomy. By undermining the feasibility of a traditionally feminine way of life,
such reforms leave women little attractive choice but to assimilate into the
modem mainstream. It seems disingenuous to these women to say that modem
reforms are simply neutral measures that enhance the range of women's choices.
Traditional women contest the very model of human experience that underlies the
liberal notion of choice-that individuals should seek to maximize control over
their own destinies. To the extent this model is internalized, a traditional way of
life is likely to be devalued and rejected. Kristin Luker, for instance, observes
that in her interviews half the pro-life activists who are full-time homemakers
33. Id. at 217.
34. Id. at 216.
35. LUKER, supra note 20, at 162.
36. GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 215 (quoting pro-life activists).
37. LUKER, supra note 20, at 170-71.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Id.
40. See KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT WORK, CAREER,
AND MOTHERHOOD 211-12 (1985).
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identified themselves in terms of the wage work they had given up, even when
they had not been in the paid labor force for as long as thirty years. Luker
suggests that such women may have "internalized their loss of status as
housewives,"'" ironically expressing the pervasiveness of a cultural value that
they ideologically oppose.42 As Kathleen Gerson observes, as women
increasingly have left home for the workplace, "those left behind have found
themselves having to defend an increasingly devalued way of life."
43
Feminists have expressed suspicion toward claims of formal neutrality, and
have insisted on attention to the concrete effects of different social policies.44
Paying such attention in this instance illustrates that exalting the abstract ideal
of choice risks obscuring the ways in which pro-life women feel that legal
reforms have undermined their welfare. To use Robert Cover's term, these
women experience as "jurispathic' '45 many of the measures that liberal feminists
have championed. To them, such measures have weakened the viability of their
"nomos" by employing law to increase the influence of a value system that they
oppose.
Conventional liberalism is likely to dismiss out of hand these women's claims
to autonomy and their contention that liberal feminist reforms have contributed
to their subordination. The universal model of the autonomous individual would
regard the advance of modern values as nothing but liberating. It is a tribute to
Professor Williams's account of autonomy that, by taking difference seriously,
her model makes it harder categorically to reject these voices. Their claim of
autonomy is plausible because many pro-life women see acceptance of traditional
gender identity as the product of struggle, reflection, and rejection of liberal
feminism. Their claim of subordination as a result of modem reform is colorable,
because these women see themselves conscripted into a regime that limits their
choices and promotes traditionally male values.
I don't purport to know how those of us who identify with feminism ultimately
should adjudicate these claims. I do know that the richness of Williams's model
makes more complicated the task of deciding which social forms are in the
interest of women, and which reforms are consistent with feminist ideals. The
ways in which Professor Williams develops her account of autonomy therefore
will give important shape to feminism's attempt to reconcile its commitments to
universality and difference in assessing civil society. That her model at this point
leaves us with less certainty than before, and more questions than answers, is a
mark not of its limitations, but of its insight, ambition, and importance.
41. LUKER, supra note 20, at 202.
42. Ide at 203.
43. GERSON, supra note 40, at 211.
44. See Minow, supra note 15, at 357.
45. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
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